only reconfigured the domestic relations of force in each country and the geopolitical map of the region as a whole, but was in fact the product of an enormous shift in the reconceptualization of the means, ends, and scope of what it means to do politics. Understanding these moments of rupture and the evolution of these Latin American struggles will prove invaluable in assessing the potentials and pitfalls in this moment of worldwide uprisings against the localized expressions of the global neoliberal dispositif.
The Revolution That Made It Possible
Given the decades that have passed and the dramatic events that have unfolded since the inception of this powerful cycle of struggle (as well as the filters of reception that have minimized its consequences, coherence, and impact), a brief retrospective is necessary to understand the unique array of political forces and conceptualizations of politics present today in Latin America. Without the details of these events (of which I can scratch only the surface here), it is easy to lose sight of the fact that each of the various moments of rupture in this cycle had a particular dynamic, related to organizational histories, innovative forms, and moments of open rebellion, but that also exceeded those histories and initiatives. A clear picture of these events and their contemporary significance seems particularly difficult from within the United States. Here these events appeared mediated through stereotyped visions of Latin American politics as mere moments in a seemingly never-ending chaos that constantly engulfs "our neighbors to the south." The consequent arrival of electoral personas were then quickly identified within the long-standing narratives of Latin American "populism" (which, independent of the limitations and possibilities of that concept, is intended in the hands of the US press to mean nothing but base demagoguery) and the Latin American caudillo. Alternatively, in a more sympathetic but nonetheless problematic vein, such events were often received within more progressive communities in the United States as the revival of the romantic figure of the guerrilla fighter and the struggle for "socialism." Although the cycle I refer to here was not divorced from such figures and ideas (as many of the essays in this issue highlight), it is exactly the relation (and distinction) among those figures, the goals of the organizations and movements, and the events of this cycle that continues to occupy the very center of the political discussion in much of Latin America today.
The problematic reception of this cycle from within the United States Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/south-atlantic-quarterly/article-pdf/111/1/1/470681/SAQ1111_01Reyes_Fpp.pdf by guest on 10 July 2019 was further complicated by the fact that in many cases the arrival of "progressive governments" throughout the region served, at least in part, to obscure the initial moments of rupture. The amount of coverage given to electoral events (the inaugurations of Rafael Correa, Evo Morales, the return of Hugo Chávez, and so on) went far beyond that given to prior moments of struggle, making it highly likely that, at least in the United States, those moments are today barely remembered if not totally unknown. As a consequence, many discussions in the United States regarding the past two decades in Latin America easily lapse into confusion between causes and effects, between new beginnings and closures, exactly the distinctions necessary to understand the direction, continuation, and scope of the current struggles for emancipation and autonomy in Latin America. In other words, if we are to understand what was truly innovative within this Latin American cycle of struggle, we must be able to make one key distinction that Forrest Hylton and Sinclair Thomson highlight for us about Bolivia (but which could be said about a number of Latin American contexts): "In our own historical view the election of Evo Morales did not bring about a revolution. It was a revolution that brought about the government of Evo Morales."1 What was that "revolution," then?
The first rumblings in what would later evolve into a tectonic shift throughout the region occurred on February 27, 1989 . That morning, informal workers, students, and marginalized residents of Caracas, Venezuela, and the nearby town of Guarenas refused to accept the neoliberal structural adjustment package implemented by then president Carlos Andrés Pérez (who had just been elected to the presidency on a clear antineoliberal platform) and imposed on Venezuela by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in exchange for increased loans (the package ended gasoline subsidies leading to an immediate and exorbitant rise in transportation and food costs). This refusal grew quickly into a full-blown, five-day urban insurrection, known as the Caracazo, consisting of barricades, looting, and persistent rioting that was initially concentrated in neighborhoods such as 23 de Enero, Catia, and El Valle, where loose organizations had formed out of exclusion from the formal political process.2 These actions quickly spread throughout the country, to which the Pérez administration (with the approval of his largest political rivals in government) responded with the massacre of hundreds if not thousands of Venezuelans. The result of this insurrection and its aftermath was the creation of an enormous chasm between that country's traditional political elite (the parties of the Pacto de Punto Fijo, particularly Acción Democrática and the Partido Social Cris-tiano) and the Venezuelan populace at large. The same chasm appeared on April 13, 2002 , when, in response to the coup d'état against Chávez, an enormous wave of self-organized action (a "chavismo without Chávez") throughout Venezuela stopped the traditional Venezuelan political elite (which was then acting with the explicit encouragement and support of various sectors within the US government) from returning to power.3
Latin America was once again shaken on the eve of January 1, 1994, when thousands of soldiers belonging to the almost exclusively indigenous Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN; Zapatista Army of National Liberation) declared war on the Mexican government and its decision to privatize rural lands and enter into the North American Free Trade Agreement. In its twelve-day offensive, the EZLN was able to overtake five municipal seats, occupy some 600,000 hectares of land, and stave off the Mexican military from an area of operation the size of most Central American countries.4 This unexpected uprising, and the spontaneous sympathy it inspired throughout Mexico and the world, was central in a long process that would eventually end the seventy-year reign of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and lead global financial corporations to insist that Mexican financial stability passed directly through the destruction of Zapatismo.5
In the spring of 2000, the people of Bolivia followed suit. Carrying their wiphalas,6 members of the Coordinadora por la Defensa del Agua y por la Vida and its allies occupied and effectively shut down the city of Cochabamba on several occasions in defiance of the rising costs created by the World Bank-mandated privatization of water in Bolivia. By April 2000, the protests had spread to the cities of La Paz, Oruro, and Potosi, blocking off transportation across much of the country and effectively ending the Bechtel Corporation's water privatization scheme, creating a nationwide awareness of the need to end structural adjustment policies.7 Two and a half years later this scene would be repeated as members of indigenous neighborhood organizations in El Alto, the Bolivian Workers Central Union, and the Union Confederation of Working Peasants of Bolivia united to lay siege to cities throughout Bolivia, demanding an end to proposed gas exports to the United States and the nationalization of gas and other natural resources.8 Once again roadblocks, strikes, and generalized blockades of several Bolivian cities brought the nation to a standstill and forced then president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada out of office in October 2003. Just two years later, Sánchez de Lozada's successor, Carlos Mesa, met the same fate as demands for resource nationalization crisscrossed with other Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/south-atlantic-quarterly/article-pdf/111/1/1/470681/SAQ1111_01Reyes_Fpp.pdf by guest on 10 July 2019 demands: calls by coca growers for an end to repression and for land redistribution; the call by indigenous organizations for the decolonization of the Bolivian state; and the generalized insistence on recovering some form of self-determination in the face of open meddling by the United States and international financial institutions in Bolivian national policy. 9 In neighboring Argentina, the combination of economic instability created by recession, the flight of foreign investment, and attempts to peg the Argentinean currency one-to-one with the US dollar led to an unprecedented level of political instability. Actions taken by the administration of Fernando de la Rúa to avoid a run on banks exacerbated the problem and even middle-class residents of Buenos Aires began to express their longstanding and overwhelming discontent-that of those who had never benefited from the wave of privatizations and neoliberal structural adjustment programs that had been implemented consistently throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Although this discontent had been evident for some time, it fully exploded on December 19 and 20, 2001 , when enormous crowds of Argentinians took to the streets banging pots and pans and chanting, "Que se vayan todos; que no quede ni uno solo" ("Out with the lot of them; let none remain"). 10 The force of the protests was quickly extended through the formation of some seventy neighborhood assemblies across Buenos Aires, the occupation of nearly two hundred factories, and the appearance of countless roadblocks or piquetes (picket lines), which became the weapons of choice for the Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados (Unemployed Workers' Movement) in a situation of highly decentralized production. The protests of 2001 and the movements that it created would eventually bring down three successive presidents, Fernando de la Rúa of Unión Cívica Radical and Adolfo Rodríguez Saá and Fernando Duhalde of the traditionally Peronist Partido Justicialista.
Events in the northern Andes were no less dramatic. On January 17, 2000, after a decade of protest, movement growth, and increasing coordination (including nationwide protests in 1990 and 1999), thousands of members of the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), displaying their wiphalas and demanding the overthrow of the "three state powers," occupied Quito in protest of deteriorating economic conditions and the proposed dollarization of the economy.11 Five days later, the CONAIE occupied the national congress and, with the support of lower-level military officials (particularly that of Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez), forced out then president Jamil Mahuad. Lucio Gutiérrez took power, but his continued implementation of neoliberal reforms and support for the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas was seen as direct treachery by the indigenous movements he had counted among his supporters, and his moves to transfer power to the executive branch were seen by large sectors of Ecuadorian society as a blatant personal power grab. In April 2005, three years after being elected president (a victory significantly supported by the CONAIE and its electoral wing, Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik), Gutiérrez was deposed as massive protests grew among even middle-class residents of Quito and Guayaquil during the Revolución Rosa (Pink Revolution). 12 Such sustained revolt was accompanied by significant tremors throughout the continent. These include the uprising of the Asamblea Popular de los Pueblos de Oaxaca (APPO) and the Sección 22 del Sindicato Nacional de los Trabajadores de la Educación against the continued reign of corruption, brutality, and neoliberal policies that the PRI imposed on state workers and indigenous people in the state of Oaxaca, Mexico; the less-well-known indigenous and afro-descendant Minga13 in Colombia that took place in autumn 2008 and was largely organized by the Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca against the implementation of a free trade agreement between Colombia and the United States and the "free trade economic model" as a whole; the uprisings of the indigenous people of Peru under the banner of the Asociaciôn Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana in May 2009 in response to legislative changes that opened up further foreign investment in mining and oil drilling projects in the Amazon region of northern Peru; the long-term land takeover strategy of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) in Brazil, which has built an organization of 1.6 million landless members in the last two decades and occupied and settled some 7.5 million hectares of land; and the migrant marches in spring 2006 in the United States that culminated in the largest single-day protest march in US history on May 1, 2006, in which amnesty for undocumented workers was demanded.14
Progressive Governments and the Demise of Neoliberal Orthodoxy
Within this atmosphere, which Mexican sociologist Raquel Gutiérrez refers to as one of generalized insurrection and insubordination, Latin American movements successfully directed their attention to the most biting elements of neoliberal adjustment and showed themselves to be the central determinant of the social and political situation of the region.15 With innovative forms of protest and organization (roadblocks, city sieges, assem-blies, rotating leadership, etc.), this wave of mass uprisings was able to place those previously excluded from the site of institutional politics (particularly indigenous peoples, the residents of the urban periphery, and marginalized intellectuals)-those who as Frantz Fanon might say, "ha[d] still not found a single bone to gnaw" within neoliberal coloniality-at the very center of political events in the region. 16 The force with which these sectors finally erupted and the heightened expectations that their success created within these communities effectively delegitimized the existing hegemonic political class in each of these countries. Not only had this political class been charged with implementing neoliberal policy and was thus despised by even the urban middle classes that had suffered under its rule, but it had also been explicitly characterized by strict lines of racialized, classed, and gendered exclusions, lines that had sustained the distinctive character of the qara and criollo elite discussed by Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui and Roland Denis in this issue. Such lines would become increasingly difficult to sustain after the newfound protagonism of these previously marginal sectors. In this sense, it is important to highlight that, intentionally or not, the past two decades of revolt not only blunted the sharpest edges of neoliberalism (privatization, deregulation, labor flexibility, and free trade) in Latin America, but they also opened an unprecedented space within the previously narrow institutional and electoral arenas.
This institutional and electoral space was quickly seized upon by counterhegemonic forces throughout the region that had for years prepared to struggle within these arenas, many of these forces led by figures that had emerged from within these same marginalized sectors. This dynamic is evident starting with the presidential inauguration of Chávez and the formation of his Movimiento Quinta Republica (Fifth Republic Movement), which would eventually morph into the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela). The figure of Chávez, it should be noted, created as much discussion and disgust from the opposition due to his indigenous and African ancestry and the fact that he was born poor than as a result of his policy positions. This was quickly followed by an avalanche of progressive electoral victories: the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a former metal worker and union organizer whose formal education didn't exceed the fourth grade, and the consolidations of The arrival of these "progressive" governments, as they are often called, was greeted with an outpouring of enthusiasm and hope that they would bring the end of both physically repressive policies and the application of the neoliberal model that had characterized many Latin American regimes throughout the 1980s. Although such a large and varied field of political projects is certain to have disparate outcomes, after some years we can see an emerging pattern within the new administrations of key Latin American countries (Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina) that help us to outline the nature and direction of what have alternatively been called the first generation of "postneoliberal" governments. In each instance, as nearly all the contributors to this issue highlight, the demands of the movements were quickly folded into the issue of the necessary reconstitution of the state in the face of the chaos produced by the application of IMF orthodoxy.
In Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela, the reconstitution of the state passed through the long process of establishing constituent assemblies and the ratification through popular referenda of new national and plurinational constitutions. These new constitutions reintroduced the state as a protagonist capable of intervening in the economic arena and responding to the claims made by indigenous and afro-descendant communities for administrative autonomy; the success of these referenda further consolidated the popularity and institutional legitimacy of the new governments. In addition, reinvigorated state protagonism and economic stability was thought to pass through the much-heralded "nationalization" of key sectors of the economy (particularly natural gas, oil, and minerals) demanded by the movements. These "nationalizations," however, did not amount to state takeovers of industry but rather to the renegotiation of the royalties due each country from multinational corporations in proportion to the revenues gained through the production and sale of natural resources (a model of private-public venture now shared by Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., Petrobras, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, and PetroEcuador). 17 Despite the limited nature of these new schemes, the increased financial capacity they provided the newly reconstituted states should not be underestimated. Bolivia provides just one example in this regard. When Morales became president in 2006, Bolivia's foreign currency reserves stood at a little more than $2 billion dollars, and the national budget was $600 million. By 2011, Bolivia's foreign currency reserves stood at $10 billion, and the national budget had grown to more than $2 billion.18 This growth in state revenue has subsequently been directed toward the formation of concerted social programs to eliminate illiteracy, alleviate health care shortages, and end poverty. Brazil's Bolsa Familia is also paradigmatic in this regard as it distributes anywhere between $30 and $60 to more than twelve million Brazilians each month in return for children's school attendance. 19 Other social programs on the continent include Socio País in Ecuador, Bono Juancito Pinto in Bolivia, Planes Sociales in Argentina, and the various misiónes in Venezuela.
In this way, increased budgets, the opening of spaces for expanded participation (referenda and constituent assemblies), the approval of pro-gressive legislation, and the opening of governmental posts made possible by the displacement of the traditional political elites20 definitively reinserted the state and state policy within the Latin American Left as a "battlefield" for the continuation of the struggles that had been waged from a number of dispersed locations prior to the arrival of the progressive governments. 21 This battlefield was envisioned not so much as the "return of politics" (as more orthodox theorists in the region would have it) over and above the "prepolitical" expressions of discontent of the previous decades, but rather as the takeover by those movements (through recently consolidated counterhegemonic parties) of previously narrow and top-down spaces. When one considers this opening of the state to the dynamics of the social movements as well as the consolidation of projects among a number of these progressive governments such as the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), especially its Banco del Sur (Bank of the South), or the Unión de Naciones Suraméricanas (Union of South American Nations), both of which have already functioned to place clear limits on attempts by the United States to continue its policy of interference in the region, the merits of these projects can hardly be contested when compared to the previous decades of neoliberal devastation. It is exactly the relations between these new anti-neoliberal governments and social movements as well as the regional relations among these governments that for many around the world, including thinkers as disparate as Antonio Negri, Perry Anderson, and Noam Chomsky, that have made Latin America a truly exceptional site for the experimentation of possible postneoliberal futures. 22 Referring to these new social programs and interregional relations in a 2011 interview, Chomsky states, "I think the developments in South America in the last decade are probably the most exciting in the world."23
Impasse; or, The Limits of Hegemony in Reverse
Yet, these accomplishments have not been unidirectional advances. As many authors have pointed out, the increasing reliance on resource extraction and monocultural crops (most specifically soy) for state revenue continues the late 1980s trend toward the deindustrialization of the region and the consequent return to near total reliance on the export of primary materials. In addition to the increased vulnerability to pricing in highly speculative global commodities markets, this "neoextractivist" turn has also meant that increased domestic social spending has been presented as directly at odds with the environmental issues created by the prevalence of these extractive industries.24 On a number of occasions this has placed the progressive governments, particularly those of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, at loggerheads with indigenous movements that raise concerns regarding the environmental effects of oil and gas extraction as well as the ceding of territorial rights this entails for their peoples. This has led to a situation in which, despite rhetoric and legislation to the contrary, the progressive governments have administered an era of continued environmental devastation (the hastening of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon under Lula is one case in point). 25 In addition, several analysts have noted the fact that the region's antipoverty programs have had extremely uneven results, with rates of poverty remaining the same in countries like Bolivia and Ecuador, decreasing in Brazil and Venezuela, but generally taking place within a widespread context of increasing levels of exploitation and inequalities in wealth and income that remain basically unchanged from the late 1990s. 26 When seen in this light, it is clear that the growth of state budgets through neoextractivism and the implementation of antipoverty programs cannot be seen solely as the product of the emancipatory demands of the movements. If the state after the arrival of the progressive governments became once again a viable battlefield within which movements could press for change, it must be noted that this battlefield was also shared by the institutions and projects of global capital. As Ecuadorian economist Pablo Dávalos reminds us, as early as 1997, in no small part as a response to the appearance of an insurrectionary climate in Latin America, the World Bank adopted the "neoinstitutional" framework as its guiding logic and signaled a sharp departure from the neoliberal orthodoxy of the IMF. 27 Within the neoinstitutional perspective, the "reconstitution of the state" takes center stage in such a way as to work toward long-term market stability (specifically through the implementation of poverty alleviation programs, the adoption of an environmental governance framework, and the establishment of a judicial system capable of adjudicating contractual disputes) while simultaneously staying true to the more orthodox neoliberal dogma regarding the virtues of economic growth and the minimal state. As Dávalos demonstrates by using the example of Ecuador and borrowing from Michel Foucault, the World Bank, unlike the IMF, had understood that neoliberalism did not so much require the destruction of the state as its proactive reorientation in which "the market" functions as the organizing principle and objective of the state. This is "a state under the supervi-sion of the market rather than a market supervised by the state" (leaving open the seemingly paradoxical possibility for what Colectivo Situaciones refers to in this issue as "nationally redistributive neoliberalism").28 Thus, while many within the Left in Latin America had been prepared to fight neoliberal orthodoxy by raising the demand for a reconstituted state, few were able to imagine that they shared this demand with a reconstituted neoliberalism, creating a situation in which it was extremely difficult to parse out one "reconstitution" of the state from the other.
Of course, one can certainly claim that any of these disappointing policy outcomes are the result of the risks and compromises one must endure when undertaking any "serious" political project. In any case, besides noting their uneven and contradictory nature, it is not my intention to pass judgment on the particular policy outcomes of the progressive governments. Rather, beyond these specific issues, I would like to emphasize an even more troubling situation: that the arrival of these counterhegemonic parties and projects in national office has effectively functioned to dissipate the very organizational autonomy and emancipatory impulses that made the rupture with orthodox neoliberalism possible.
For example, it is now widely noted that the construction and deployment of antipoverty programs throughout the region have had a dangerously depoliticizing effect in that the same dominated and exploited subjects who recently brought the traditional elites to their knees are today presented as "the poor," mere objects of government assistance rather than the creative and innovative subjects of this new situation.29 Furthermore, the level of social control afforded by the handouts from social programs has not been lost on those opposed to the movements. For example, US consular officials in Brazil charged with collecting information on the MST note that President Lula "has been conspicuously silent on his early promises to support the MST" and, further, that the MST has been increasingly marginalized exactly because of programs like Bolsa Familia. After conversations with experts on the topic, Thomas White, the US consul in Sao Paulo, stated bluntly that in addition to generalized discouragement due to Lula's lack of support, the MST had difficulty maintaining membership because "many Bolsa Familia recipients are reluctant to join MST for fear of losing their benefits." 30 In other words, it is becoming increasingly apparent that what we are today witnessing in Latin America is a new diagram of power in which movements have been seemingly locked into the position of either supporting or opposing state policy enacted by functionaries who are thought to speak in their name. If neoliberal orthodoxy in Latin America functioned through rigid lines of exclusion in relation to indigenous peoples, those on the urban periphery, and radical intellectuals, the current situation is characterized by the fact that the inspirational value of these subjects of struggle, often embodied in the heads of state (Evo, Lula, Chávez, Correa), is the very basis on which contemporary neoliberal legitimation is founded. Ironically, this gives the progressive governments an illusory autonomy over the movements and therefore the unprecedented capacity to simply discount the very movements they are thought to embody. Consider as just one example the glee expressed by US consular officials at the powerful disorientation created when a "self-proclaimed 21st century socialist" (in this case Correa) denounced opposition coming from indigenous groups and unions as "infantile" leftists and "imperialists."31 Several progressive governments have acted similarly based on this same illusion, leading to very public disputes with formerly staunch supporters-Álvaro García Linera's labeling of formerly close movements and theorists as "infantile rightists" is but one example. 32 More important, this situation has created tremendous confusion within the movements that have consequently lost the capacity to mobilize their base independent of the electoral figures they made possible but who no longer respond to their concerns. This effectively ends the long cycle of struggle detailed above and tendentially undercuts the base on which these progressive governments were built. Thus, from one perspective, an "impasse" (to pick up a phrase used by Colectivo Situaciones) far beyond anything resembling cooptation has been reached: the social movements have lost their position of political protagonism due to the symbolic authority afforded to the progressive governments, while the progressive governments have in turn increasingly lost the social base necessary to produce substantive change within the state. The latter is due to the actions these governments have taken against the efficacy and autonomy of the movements in order to meet the seemingly intractable necessity of presenting themselves as the hegemonic force in politics while holding the reins of the state. Within this "impasse," a new diagram of power, which Francisco de Oliveira has termed "hegemony in reverse," is consolidated such that previously excluded subjects are explicitly included (in the very figures of the counterhegemonic leaders) and are simultaneously markedly subordinate to the counterhegemonic parties and projects, to the state structures those parties inhabit, and to the continuing inequality over which that state administrates.33 From this perspective, one can understand why, despite decades of struggle and without disregarding the enthusiasm of some observers such as Chomsky, Raúl Ornelas concludes in his essay in this issue that at the end of this tremendous cycle of struggle "everything remains more or less the same."
Another Cycle? Or, An Other Politics?
From 1989 to 2006, there was an overwhelming focus on the anti-neoliberal character of Latin American movements. Throughout this period the horizon of the movements was understood as the immediate necessity of creating political initiatives that would definitively end the forceful imposition of IMF-style structural adjustment programs by traditional national hegemonic elites. It is difficult not to conclude that on this account the movements did in fact "succeed," as they simultaneously diminished the potential for repressive solutions and forced open a space for counterhegemonic projects and marginalized populations to access the levers of state power. As a consequence, some have claimed that we have entered a new phase of the struggle in which all political antagonism should be conceived of only as contending policy agendas within the state as administered by counterhegemonic governments. Implicit within this framework is a temporal logic that tends to determine the extent and density of the original moment of rupture from within the logic of existing institutions, effectively crushing any true novelty. That is, counterhegemonic logic, given its acceptance of the parameters of politics as lying fully within the dynamics between civil society and the state, can see those moments only as moving from uncivil to civil, from the prepolitical to the political, from movements to the state. The moment of rupture is deemed fundamentally incoherent and thus pending the work of articulation so as to gain the legibility necessary to enter the realm of the political as always already given-the state. The extreme limitation here is that these moments of rupture are viewed only from the capacity they have to create effects within the dominant political logic. In other words, within this framework there can be no moments of actual rupture; there is only a never-ending chain of hegemony and counterhegemony between which the point of iterability is provided by the relation of domination (command-obedience) implicit within the liberal/colonial state. (It is interesting to note that exactly this vision provides a point of unity for social democrats, culturalists, and sectarians of various stripes throughout Latin America today.) Consequently, this understanding of moments of rupture reduces their direction and scope to a mere Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/south-atlantic-quarterly/article-pdf/111/1/1/470681/SAQ1111_01Reyes_Fpp.pdf by guest on 10 July 2019 reaction to the negative elements within a given conjuncture (i.e., antineoliberal). The subjects that produce these moments are thus also reduced to merely making demands from the existing political order.
Yet, almost at the very moment that the consolidation of the progressive governments and the deactivation of larger sectors of the social movements made evident the end of the cycle that spanned 1989 to approximately 2006, a series of events have taken place that seem to place us on the edge of yet another cycle. These include the emergence of the Zapatistas' Other Campaign directed against the entirety of the Mexican political class, including, much to the dismay of many "progressive" intellectuals, the institutional Left embodied in the PRD;34 the vicious dispute between Correa and the CONAIE as well as renegade elements of Correa's own party, made clear both in their refusal to support him during the "police riots" of late September of 2010 as well as in their active support of the "No" option during the Correa-sponsored 2011 referendum (which included questions on media ownership, financial services, and bullfighting); the immediate and resounding rejection of Evo Morales's holiday gasolinazo (a cut to gasoline subsidies that would have doubled the price of gasoline and markedly increased the price of transportation and food); major strikes in August 2011 led by indigenous organizations in El Alto; the resistance of indigenous groups in the Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure (a national park in Bolivia) to the construction of a highway through their lands; and the recent worker, indigenous, and peasant insurrections in the lower Amazon and in Jirau, Brazil. Given these revolts it seems that whereas from one angle the new diagram of power in Latin America presents itself as an impasse, from another it can be perceived as the outline of a new political situation from which elements are drawn in order to launch actions that move further in the direction of the new political horizon implied in the initial moment of rupture.
It is extremely difficult from within the counterhegemonic framework to shed any light on this recent wave of revolts that took place in the context of governments that are themselves considered counterhegemonic, except perhaps to characterize them as the handmaiden of the Right. But this perspective ultimately proves untenable in that it pits the recently elected progressive governments against social movements in such a way that, as mentioned above, gives electoral phenomena an exteriority and independence over and above the efficacy of the movements that they simply do not have. Alternatively, those that have been close to the movements these past two decades offer a rather different understanding of politics than the one implied from within the counterhegemonic projects. Bolivian political scientist Luis Tapia and Brazilian geographer Carlos Walter Porto-Gonçalves argue that it is a mistake to understand politics as what occurs in the interactions between social movements (i.e., civil society) and the state.35 Rather, it is more accurate to speak of societal movements in that the initial moment of rupture always takes place due to the decision made by the forces that are not accounted for in the given order of places-in either civil society or the state-to break the social inertia and move (as was made evident in the actions of the indigenous peoples and the urban periphery throughout Latin America in the past two decades), to take action that creates an entire reordering of those places. From within this perspective, then, civil society and the state are never the locations of politics per se; at best they are its consequence (markers or indexes of the given order) or its antithetical point, where political action meets a series of mechanisms intended to restore stasis.
This conceptual reformulation of politics parallels the experiences of the various organizations and movements that were so central in the last two decades. As Raúl Zibechi notes in this issue and elsewhere, the movements that came to the fore in the last twenty years were in fact sustained by organizational innovations and a concept of political action that actually emerged prior to the anti-neoliberal wave. These emerged in the worldwide movement for decolonization and the women's liberation movement that decentered the state as the site of change, the industrial proletariat and the economy as the subject of change, and the West as the origin and location of that change.36 As Fanon notes in The Wretched of the Earth, within the unfolding of the anticolonial struggles it had become apparent that liberation could not be confused with the minimal program of expelling the occupiers and taking their place. Rather, it involved the much more complex matter of reckoning with the scope and direction of self-government. Far beyond national sovereignty and formal independence, this implied acting from the following principles: the people are not a herd to be led/ leaders no longer exist; the only legitimate function of political bodies is to create spaces in which the people can speak, listen, and innovate for themselves; and finally, everyone must decide. In sum, during the anticolonial struggle it became clear that sovereignty must be the exact equivalent of dignity, or it is nothing.37 The struggle for liberation, then, was not equivalent to the establishment of external (national independence) or internal (state) sovereignty (a question of new inhabitants for the given places).
It began to appear as inextricable from the struggle for the construction of nondomination (a reordering made possible by the creation of as-yetunknown places).
Given the continuing sustenance the anticolonial struggle has provided Latin American movements, it is no surprise that placing society in movement has remained central, while the relation between this action and the long-term goals of counterhegemonic projects has been rather tenuous. Take the Zapatistas, who declared, "what we want . . . is not to take power, but to exercise it,"38 the Argentinean "Que se vayan todos; que no quede ni uno solo," and Silvia Rivera's assessment from Bolivia, "Pachakutik is not the taking of power but the subversion of [that] power."39 All these statements, building on the sequence of struggles that took place during the 1960s and 1970s, eschew the notion that substantive transformation is achieved through state power, even if the practical relation of those movements toward the effective reality of power as expressed in state structures (and thus to counterhegemonic projects) remains unresolved.
I would like to propose, then, that the most recent revolts, far from handmaidens of the Right, are better understood as the resurfacing of contradictions within "the movement" itself. In other words, what might appear today as temporally succeeding cycles of struggle, the first against orthodox neoliberalism and the latter against progressive governments, is instead the expression of two distinct tendencies that have characterized these movements and organizations across various cycles of struggle but that temporarily found common ground in the struggle against neoliberalism (forcing us to push beyond the politically ambiguous unity implied by the discourse of movement or "movement of movements" that was often deployed throughout the past cycle).40 That is, for many within these movements, the counterhegemonic parties and projects of the last twenty years were never intended as an independent end, despite the fact that today certain sectors in the progressive governments seem to desire for that to have been so. Rather, they were intended as one tactic among others in a growing strategy for the dismantling of domination/hegemony as such. Thus, although I could not agree more with Hylton and Thomson that the election of the progressive governments "did not bring about a revolution" but instead "it was a revolution that brought about [the progressive governments]," it is the conceptualization and direction of that revolution that today remains in play between these competing tendencies. As demonstrated in the essays gathered here, in this light a (re)examination of the perspectives of autonomy and emancipation that have built a framework for political thought and action intertwined with, but ultimately beyond, counterhegemony, take on an overwhelming importance today.
Addressing the question of the conceptualization of this revolution and moving in a rather different direction than the traditional counterhegemonic logic, there is a growing chorus (particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador) that points to the necessity of reinitiating the transformative processes in each country that many feel were brought to a halt by the search for stability and homogeneity of the progressive governments. For these analysts, the progressive governments have lost their way in that they did not create the mechanisms to make the dynamics of the movements the motor of the new governments, and as a consequence they have fallen back on the mere defense of their own hegemonic presence within the state structure. If the transformative process has effectively been halted above, these theorists propose that a reinitiation or redirection of the transformative process must therefore take place below, within the movements.41 They insist that the movements must once again rebuild and mobilize independent of the counterhegemonic parties and projects in order to impose again their vision from below on those spaces above. In this formula, the reinitiation of mass mobilizations would serve to short-circuit the elements of stasis inherent in the state, and this transformative process would function to complete the work that was left undone during the last two decades.
More specifically, these theorists call for the authentic implementation of the constitutions that were approved in national referenda but then seemingly cut short by the agenda of the progressive governments. These constitutions, they argue, already provide for the institutional framework that will eschew the party-state apparatus and give the movements a more permanent and direct presence within the state. The goal from this perspective is to radicalize institutions of democratic state representation so as to invert the logic of state structures from locations that implement topdown initiatives to ones that facilitate the self-activity of the movements. In essence, they would provide a constant feedback loop that would run between constituent power and constituted power, between the cycles of struggles of the movements and the structures and functions of the state. In this way they would provide an institutional form adequate to the knowledge that the state "is built on and lives off plebeian potential,"42 that the state structure beyond an impediment or even secondary index must help facilitate the political initiatives emanating from the movements.43 Ironically, as Bruno Bosteels reminds us, Álvaro García Linera, today seen by many as a prime agent of the missteps of the Morales administration, gives us some of the most interesting theorizations regarding the possibility of redirecting state functions "to support as much as possible the unfolding of society's autonomous organizational capacities" and thus the possibility of a state formation that would facilitate the establishment of nondomination, or "communism."44
For others it is exactly the recent revolts against the progressive governments that highlight the need to move beyond this tentative alliance between radical democratic representational state function and nondomination. From this perspective, the current impasse is not the result of opportunists or self-centered figures in the progressive governments (as is sometimes implied by their opposition on the left) but stems rather from a radical underestimation of the constraints inherent in the idea that the liberal/colonial state and its representative institutions could be used for an end independent of capitalist domination.
Let us consider the evaluation of Fredric Jameson, who from a rather different location highlights what has become dramatically evident within the impasse in Latin America, but which increasingly characterizes the neoliberal dispositif (what Sheldon S. Wolin alternatively terms "Democracy Inc.") around the globe as a whole: With the emergence of capital then, a host of the traditional categories of constitutional thinking become unserviceable, among them citizenship and representation; while the very idea of democracy as such-always a pseudoconcept and for most of its historical existence in any case a term of opprobrium-becomes a misleading illusion. The state is no longer an autonomous entity, to be theorized by its own intellectual and specialized discipline, but has become so infiltrated by capital that any autonomous economic theory is impossible as well; and nowhere is this symbiosis more evident as in our own time, where moralizing (and traditional) terms like corruption and faction have become amusing period pieces.45
Despite sympathizing with such a position, those who propose the radicalization of democratic representation as a way out of the neoliberal order seem unable to think nondomination today except as a consequence of inhabiting the institutions of representational democracy. The danger here is twofold. First, by attempting to inhabit the liberal state and its representative institutions as means to a different end, these sectors radically underestimate the constitutive function of the liberal state in capitalist society. Undergirding this perspective is a reduction of the state to either a purely repressive apparatus or to a mere superstructural element (a secondary reflection and therefore instruments of the underlying dynamics of capital). In both cases it is possible for the state to be inhabited and redirected for purposes exterior to capital (social democracy), abolished (anarchism), or a mixture thereof (the socialist transition). As Raúl Cerdeiras (founder of Grupo Acontecimiento) claims, it is exactly the contemporary Latin American conjuncture (the appearance of the progressive governments, the ensuing impasse, and the new revolts) that has exposed this vision of the state as ultimately inadequate. Drawing on the work of Alain Badiou, Cerdeiras points out that within these visions of the state as either repressive or expressive (merely superstructural), the "metastructural" or primary ordering function of the state remains completely unanalyzed.46
Through the practices of representation, Cerdeiras notes, the state's primary productive function is to fragment immediate social ties into various identities, groups, and factions, which can then be accounted for (or counted) by the liberal state as one interest group, one fungible part, among other ones. Once reduced to subjects of interest, to a mere part, members of this society have little choice but to acknowledge the liberal state as the location from which all parts are ordered-the attainment of recognition, the petitioning of rights, and the arbiter of conflict. In this process of assigning social places to each part through the practices of representation, the state becomes the ultimate guarantor that the "outplace" (that which cannot be counted, that which has no interests) does not appear or, rather, that the "outplace" is neutralized by redirecting its appearance right back into the play of factions and interests.47 For Cerdeiras, then, the liberal order that runs from society to representation through political parties and ends in state administration is far from a neutral medium that can be either occupied or abolished in a strategy to move beyond that of capital. It is rather a central location for the production of the subjects of interest without which "the market" and capital would be inoperable. Given this ordering function of the state, anyone attempting to "take" the liberal state (through whatever means) is far more likely to end up taken by it. Francisco de Oliveira remarks on exactly this dynamic with regard to the more than 21,000 PT functionaries that today inhabit the Brazilian state: "if the appearance is that of a total occupation of the state by the party, on closer inspection one sees that the opposite is taking place: the party is being dissolved into the state, in the sense that the tasks, obligations and rationale of the state have imposed themselves on the functions of the party."48 Consequently, the second risk is that in occupying the state one is simply reconstituting domination/hegemony under a new leadership and in the name of new subjects (as has seemingly taken place under the contemporary situation of "reverse hegemony" in Latin America). The Zapatistas noted this tendency long ago with regard to the counterhegemonic struggles of the 1970s:
What always remained unresolved was the role of people . . . in what became ultimately a dispute between two hegemonies. There is an oppressor power which decides on behalf of society from above, and a group of visionaries which decides to lead the country on the correct path and ousts the other group from power, seizes power and then also decides on behalf of society. For us that is a struggle between hegemonies, in which the winners are good and the losers bad, but for the rest of society things basically don't change. . . . You cannot reconstruct the world or society, nor rebuild national states now in ruins, on the basis of a quarrel over who will impose their hegemony on society.49
The problem posed here by the Zapatistas is echoed and forcefully summarized by Arif Dirlik: "Hegemony is hegemony whether it is revolutionary or not, and the goal of liberation is to abolish hegemony, not to perpetuate it. Indeed, the greatest obstacle to liberation may not be hegemony of one kind or another but the very inability to imagine life without hegemony."50 From the perspectives laid out by Cerdeiras as well as the Zapatistas, we see that the recent revolts might also then be viewed as a signal that the dispositions within the movements that looked to the reconstitution of the state as either an end (the position defended today by the parliamentary parties and progressive governments) or even a means to an end (as expressed in the movements of the past two decades as well as many of the advocates of an attempt to reinitiate the process of transformation) were always shadowed by a third vision that saw nondomination or nonhegemony as both a means and an end ultimately incompatible with the logic of counterhegemony and representation.
Here we can cast new light on the movements' emphasis on their internal intensification through the explicit focus on spatial reorganization and the creation of new territorialities, the strengthening of their capacity to meet their immediate material needs (a pragmatism of needs that stands in sharp contrast to the realpolitik pragmatism of the counterhegemonic parties), and an emphasis on political bodies (neighborhood and community assemblies) outside of the liberal state system (each tendency is discussed in detail by the authors in this issue). These actions should be viewed, then, not as actions of an as-yet-undeveloped "prepolitical" movement, but rather as the expression of an epochal shift in the very conception of political action, the painful birth of an other politics whose main focus is the production and organization of antagonistic subjects rather than the occupation of positions within the given state apparatus, the production and organization of "non-hegemonic subjectivit[ies] that still have the integrity to pursue the quest for liberation" rather than electoral figureheads.51 This is a position perhaps most clearly taken up by the Zapatistas, "We think that if we can conceptualize a change in the premise of power, the problem of power, starting from the fact that we don't want to take it, that could produce another kind of politics, another kind of political actor, other human beings that do politics differently than the politicians that we have today across the political spectrum."52
In this light, the demand that emerges in Latin America today for the destruction of the entire political class (whether hegemonic or counterhegemonic, on the right or on the left) cannot be understood as the call for the recuperation of some original human freedom prior to state domination and exterior to the contemporary mode of production (what would amount to some form of anarchism), but rather should be understood as the recognition that imagining life beyond the capitalist mode of production has become completely inseparable from the necessity to practice politics beyond the liberal state and representation, which are central to the production and reproduction of this mode (a feat for which social democracy, socialism, and anarchism seem poorly equipped). It is a recognition that the generation of antagonistic political subjects will not emerge from either the competing interests managed by the liberal state or from the latent dynamics of capital (nor from their simple destruction). That is, they will not be a product of those practices we know as "the West." Rather, these new subjects can emerge only through the slow and deliberate processes of exteriorization from both the liberal state and capital through the invention and deployment of practices of nondomination that are made possible by the reorganization of political and economic life in the here and now.53 Interestingly, it is among the indigenous peoples of Latin America where these practices have flourished, making them an exemplary site for the possibility of life beyond "the West," not due to some preexisting epistemological or even ontological exteriority but due to their insistence on inventing and reinventing governmental practices of exteriorization that are fundamentally incompatible with the liberal/colonial state. Yet, it is not so much that these projects of separation in Latin America present themselves as a solution, but rather, their importance seems to lie in the fact that they have created the necessary space in which to be able to conceive of the actual enormity of the obstacles that seem to lie ahead for us all.
Given the prescience of these struggles, Latin America will thus continue to be an incredibly rich situation in which to examine the dynamics that are very likely to be encountered by those movements arising throughout the world in this moment of global indignation. From counterhegemonic parties to the radical democratization of the liberal state, from radical democracy to the birth of another politics, the contemporary situation in Latin America provides a kaleidoscope of struggles through which we can closely explore the likely pitfalls and potentials of those projects that seek to undo the global neoliberal dispositif, a laboratory where we can learn to distinguish and select between projects that aim to change governments and those that will settle for nothing less than changing politics.
Notes
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